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ABSTRACT SAVANNAH E. WHITTEMORE:
The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate the connection between word and action in
relation to media incited genocide. By employing the operational definitions of intent,
incitement, genocide, and hate speech from legal texts such as the Genocide Convention
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, this thesis shows that there
is suitable jurisprudence on the crime of direct and public incitement to genocide with the
legal bodies statute mirrors the language of the Genocide Convention. This in
conjunction with the language gradient on the changing role of messages before and
during genocide shows that regulation could be achieved by legal bodies such as the
International Criminal Court (ICC) if the language of their governing document changes.
The evidence provided by the case studies of Rwanda and Myanmar supports the
suggestion of amending language for more widespread enforcement power. This thesis
does not seek to address all genocide, but rather the instances of genocide where direct
and public incitement to violence occurred through media sources.

Keywords: media, incitement, genocide, hate speech, Genocide Convention, Rwanda,
Myanmar, ICC, and Rome Statute
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Introduction
Incitement through language comes from ethnocentric or völkisch words
repurposed as rhetorical weapons. Repurposed words or abbreviated language are where
the complexity of a word is reduced to phrases suitable for the masses. The greatest
mobilization of the apolitical sections of society is achieved with recoded words. This
section of society views themselves as increasingly powerless and believe less and less in
political participation. Although the verbal path from complexity reduction to prejudice is
a multi-step process, there exists a direct correlation from word to action.1 The
correlation refers to the violence achieved with aggressive language and negative
connotation. The violence achieved does not always include crimes on the scale of
genocide; however, the use of abbreviated language as a means of incitement often
results in humanitarian crises such as genocide, the focus of this thesis.
The phenomena of genocides are not a new outcome of global conflict. There
have been genocides long before the term was coined in the 20th Century. This thesis
does not attempt to address all genocides based on how we define it today. It will address
the methods for inciting genocide that have evolved along with modern media from
written word to radio, and most recently with social media. These mass media sources
allow for the dissemination of information easily across large populations. This thesis
defines genocide, intent, direct and public incitement, and hate speech with the general
objective of establishing operational definitions for application to legal issues. This thesis
combines relevant legal texts and the appropriate case law to elucidate each term within
the analysis. To clarify whether the existing international legal institutions have the

Paul Sailer-Wlasits, “Hass-Rede: Zur Kulturgeschichte Eines Sprachlichen Phänomens,” carta.info,
September 19, 2016, http://carta.info/hass-rede/)
1
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enforcement power to prosecute media incited genocide, this thesis examines the texts of
the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide
Convention), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) on the adjudication of
hate speech and genocide to create a legal framework for case study analysis.
This thesis seeks to address the question of whether existing international law has
the necessary customs and norms to regulate hate speech as defined by the ICCPR. Using
the language of the ICCPR and the mirroring language of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
Statutes to the Genocide Convention, this thesis will argue that the jurisprudence in case
law offers suitable standards for the consistent criminal prohibition of hate speech that
has evolved into direct and public incitement to genocide. In addition to these sufficient
customs and norms on the prosecution of genocide, this thesis will emphasize the lack of
necessary enforcement power to regulate hate speech that ultimately results in incitement
to genocide by legal institutions such as the ICC. The goal of case study analysis is to
show that by treating incitement to genocide as a separate crime the regulation of
genocide can be better achieved.
The case law used in this thesis includes Akayesu, Kamuhanda, Kayishema et al.,
Muvunyi, Nahimana et al., Rutaganda, and Seromba. The cases of Akyesu, Muvunyi, and
Nahimana et al. establish the jurisprudence on direct and public incitement to genocide.
Others such as the accused in cases such as Kamuhanda, Muhimana, Rutaganda,
Seromba, and Kayishema et al., were held responsible for conspiracy to commit genocide
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and other related crimes against humanity. In each of these selected cases, individuals
were held responsible for inciting or acting out genocide.
In Chapter One, the legal analysis of genocide from Nuremberg to the ICC
establishes individual culpability of genocide before various courts and tribunals. This
chapter builds operational definitions of genocide, intent, and direct and public
incitement to genocide to clarify that jurisprudence exists on incitement to genocide
through hate speech through case study analysis. This chapter introduces the primary case
study analysis that draws from the convictions and sentences of Ferdinand Nahimana,
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze for genocide, incitement to genocide,
conspiracy, crimes against humanity, extermination, and persecution.2 This case was
popularly dubbed the “Media Case,” and serves as a precedent for the future prosecution
of direct incitement to genocide. This chapter ends with the introduction of the
International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute and the limitations of the language
used on the crime of incitement.
Two case studies were selected as examples of how colonial presence can evolve
into ethnic disparities long after the disappearance of colonial power. Chapter Two
introduces the Rwandan genocide with a history of the conflict. This overview includes a
preview of the issues that arose from the colonial occupation of Rwanda by Belgium and
the historic differences between the two majority ethnic groups, Hutu and Tutsi. This
chapter emphasizes that the differences that played a role in the Rwandan Genocide were
exacerbated by the Belgian colonial occupation. In addition, this chapter investigates the
role of both newspapers and radio in Rwanda in the early 1990s with a focus on the role

2

Nahimana, et al., (Amended Indictment), 13 April 2000, section 8.
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of radio and newspaper. This investigation will focus on the changing role of the
messages that arose before and during the genocide. The evolution from word to action is
proven through the differences in speech acts.
Chapter Three introduces the second case study with a historical overview of the
conflict focusing on the colonial rule in Myanmar and the evolution of a Muslim
Nationalist Movement. The overview provides a background on the historical claims that
Rohingya Muslims have made for political emancipation and present-day events that
have contributed to ethnic tensions in several townships. This chapter demonstrates the
influences of military-style rule in post-dictatorial Myanmar on claims made regarding a
targeted genocide against the Rohingya. Presently, The Republic of The Gambia (The
Gambia) has brought forth proceedings in front of The International Court of Justice
(ICJ) to issue a provisional order on the possibility and potential of genocide in
Myanmar.
Chapter Four introduces a language gradient used to demonstrate the extent to
which words have power over action. The types of messaging explained in this chapter
can be compared to the escalation of rhetoric in media sources in both Rwanda and
Myanmar. This chapter confirms the culpability of an individual on genocide with the
previous decisions made by international courts and tribunals. The end of this chapter
will suggest how the research discovered with types of language, the role of the media,
and existing jurisprudence on genocide cannot regulate speech at the level necessary to
prevent large scale genocide. Building on these conclusions, the last section will suggest
reasons for how amending the Rome Statute’s language could enable more strict
regulations of incitement to genocide.

4

Chapter One: A Legal Analysis of Genocide: From Nuremberg to the ICC
Before Raphaël Lemkin’s 1944 book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe’s
introduction of the term genocide, no word existed to describe the atrocities of the
Holocaust and other similar events that occurred in the early twentieth century such as the
Armenian Genocide.3 Lemkin, a Holocaust survivor and refugee living in the United
States of America, combined Latin and Greek root words to form a term now regularly
used in legal proceedings.4 The term genocide comes from the root words “genus” and
“cide.” “Genus” is Greek for race and “cide” is Latin for killing. The combined roots
were combined to describe the horrific, systematic murders of the Holocaust.5 Before and
during the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (IMT), the crime of genocide was
not yet codified under international law.6 Before the legal proceedings took place,
Lemkin described genocide as the following:
A coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups
themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political
and social institutions of culture, language, national feelings, religion and
economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal
security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to
such groups. Genocide is directed against individuals, not in their individual
capacity, but as members of the national group.7
Atrocity Speech Law Scholar Gregory Gordon uses the words of Lemkin to emphasize
the history of the term. In his book, Raphaël Lemkin insisted that future anti-genocide

3

Gregory S. Gordon, Atrocity Speech Law: Foundation, Fragmentation, and Fruition (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 116.
4
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum), accessed
November 11, 2019, https://www.ushmm.org/learn/timeline-of-events/after-1945.
5
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum), accessed
November 12, 2019, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/what-is-genocide.
6
Gregory S. Gordon, Atrocity Speech Law: Foundation, Fragmentation, and Fruition, p. 116.
7
Raphaël Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International,
1944): 79.
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laws needed to include criminal liability for those who created teaching materials
intended to instruct future perpetrators on the philosophy of genocide and not only those
who incited genocide.8
While the term genocide had no legal function during the Nuremberg
proceedings, the term enabled prosecutors from the United States, France, and the United
Kingdom to qualify the systematic persecution of various groups by the Nazis.9
Following the decisions made by the Tribunal, the United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 96 (I) adopted on December 11, 1946, affirmed, “that genocide is a crime
under international law which the civilized world condemns.”10 While this resolution
failed to reference the crime of genocide during peacetime, it set forth a three-phased
process for drafting the Genocide Convention.11
1.1 Drafting the Genocide Convention
On December 9, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Genocide Convention which outlined the specific conditions for international law to use
to prosecute future cases of genocide.12 The prohibition and the international
community’s responsibility to prevent genocide are recognized as international
obligations under the Genocide Convention. In Article 1 of the Genocide Convention, the
parties “confirm that genocide whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a
crime under international law…”13 The contracting parties of the treaty assigned
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Gregory S. Gordon, Atrocity Speech Law: Foundation, Fragmentation, and Fruition, p. 116-7.
Gregory S. Gordon, Atrocity Speech Law: Foundation, Fragmentation, and Fruition, p. 117.
10
G.A. Res. 96 (I), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1, at 189 (1946).
11
Gregory S. Gordon, Atrocity Speech Law: Foundation, Fragmentation, and Fruition, p. 119.
12
William A. Schabas, “Genocide Law in a Time of Transition: Recent Developments in the Law of
Genocide,” Rutgers Law Review 61, no. 1 (Fall 2008): 161.
13
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 1, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat.
3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
9
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importance to the need to prevent future atrocities that mirrored the Holocaust in scale.
This convention asserts that every state in the international community is obligated to
punish the crime of genocide as described.14
The convention is used by many legal scholars as the basis of arguments made for
the prosecution of genocide in both international military tribunals and international
courts. Principles which create the framework and legal norms of international law that
cannot be placed to the side.15 The principles outlined in the Genocide Convention are
considered jus cogens norms under international law. Jus cogens norms are the
fundamental overriding principles of international law.16 As such, even if a nation is not
a party to the Genocide Convention or has ratified the document with reservations, the
prohibition on genocide as a jus cogens norm means that no one anywhere can commit,
conspire to commit, or incite genocide.
This thesis will use the definition of genocide provided in Article 2 of the treaty in
the application on the crimes considered by contracting parties to be genocide. Article 2
explains that the crime of genocide includes:
“…any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”17

Irwin Cotler, “State-Sanctioned Incitement to Genocide: The Responsibility to Prevent,” in The Content
and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 2012, pp. 430-455): 430.
15
“Jus Cogens,” Legal Information Institute (Legal Information Institute), accessed April 10, 2020,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/jus_cogens)
16
Irwin Cotler, “State-Sanctioned Incitement to Genocide: The Responsibility to Prevent,” pp. 430-1.
17
Genocide Convention, Art. 2.
14
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The following article, Article 3 of the Genocide Convention, establishes the aspects of
genocide that result in punishment. The language of the Convention remains vital to legal
decisions today as it not only requires the parties to punish genocide but holds those who
orchestrate and premeditate acts of genocide accountable.
Article 3 of the Genocide Convention assigns the type of genocide punishable as
agreed by the contracting parties. It states, “…(a) genocide; (b) conspiracy to commit
genocide; (c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) attempt to commit
genocide; (e) complicity in genocide.”18 This article in conjunction with the second
article supports the argument that not only committing the act of genocide results in the
punishment of such a crime but also the conspiracy and direct and public incitement to
genocide. Applying both Articles II and III of the Genocide Convention to cases of media
incited genocide, allows the individuals who contribute to “direct and public incitement
to commit genocide” to be prosecuted under institutions such as post-war military
tribunals and international courts.19
1.2 ICTY and ICTR Statutes and Case Law
In the immediate aftermath of genocide, the legal institutions of the world face the
problem of individual culpability to incitement of genocide through hate speech. The
previous cases of Streicher and Fritzsche in front of Nuremberg dealt with incitement to
murder and extermination as crimes against humanity.20 In the post-war trials at the IMT,
the initial precedent for culpability on incitement to genocide was established with the
indictment and sentence of Julius Streicher, the founder of the anti-Semitic and racist

18

Genocide Convention, Art. 3.
Genocide Convention, art. 3, c.
20
Muvunyi, (Trial Chamber), September 12, 2006, paras. 500-01.
19
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publication titled Der Stürmer.21 Streicher’s commitment to the spread of National
Socialism throughout Bavaria in the 1920s helped establish him as the voice of National
Socialism in his region.22 Also, Streicher’s position as the leading organizer of Nazi
Germany’s first official boycott of Jewish owned businesses set him apart as an
influential source of propaganda for the everyday German.23
In the judgment rendered by the IMT, Streicher was found guilty on Count Four.
The Judgment cites, “There is no evidence to show that he was ever within Hitler's inner
circle advisers; nor during his career was he closely connected with the formulation of the
policies which led to war”24 This decision alone sets the legal precedent that individuals
can be held accountable for crimes against humanity in the absence of clear involvement.
The precedent set before the IMT on individual culpability has influenced the decisions
made before the ICTY and ICTR on incitement, particularly with hate speech.
Until 1993, there was no major legal advancement on Genocide until the ICTY
was formed in response to the Yugoslav War, and a year later the ICTR in response to the
Rwandan Genocide.25 The ICTY was responsible for the prosecution of peoples in
serious violation of international humanitarian law committed in the former Yugoslavia
in 1991.26 This international tribunal is relevant as it treated direct incitement as a

Ermakov, Alexandr. "‘A Blood Czar of Franconia’: Gauleiter Julius Streicher." Historia Provinciae:
журнал региональной истории 2, no. 2 (2018): pp. 43.
22
"‘A Blood Czar of Franconia’: Gauleiter Julius Streicher." pp. 32.
23
"‘A Blood Czar of Franconia’: Gauleiter Julius Streicher." pp. 36.
24
“The Trial of German Major War Criminals: Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at
Nuremberg Germany,” Avalon Project - Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, accessed April 10,
2020, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judstrei.asp)
25
Thomas E. Davies, “How the Rome Statute Weakens the International Prohibition on Incitement to
Genocide,” Human Rights Documents Online, August 21, 2009, pp. 245-270, https://doi.org/10.1163/22107975_hrd-9944-0021, p.245-6.
26
UN Security Council, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (as
amended on 17 May 2002), 25 May 1993, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3dda28414.html
[accessed 10 April 2020] [hereinafter ICTY Statute]
21
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separate crime in cases such as Jelisic.27 In 1994, the ICTR was the first international
court of law established to prosecute individuals for crimes against humanity in Africa.28
The function of this court was to hold those allegedly responsible for the 1994 Rwandan
Genocide accountable.29 The ICTR is a notable source of case law due to the decisions
rendered on intent and direct and public incitement to genocide.30
In Akayesu, he was charged with using his executive ability to commit the crime
of genocide as a leader of his prefecture.31 In Muvunyi, he was charged and sentenced on
the charges of complicity in genocide and direct and public incitement to genocide.32 In
Nahimana et al., the three individuals were charged with direct and public incitement to
genocide.33 In Kamuhanda, the accused was held responsible for the charges of
conspiracy to commit genocide and direct and public incitement to genocide.34 In
Kayishema et al., the individuals were held responsible for several large-scale massacres
that contributed to genocide.35 In Muhimana, he was held responsible for complicity in
genocide and rape and murder as crimes against humanity.36 In Rutaganda, he was
charged and held responsible for genocide and crimes against humanity. In Seromba, he
was charged and sentenced for his role in the genocide, complicity in genocide,

27

ICTY Statute Art. 4(3)(c)
“The ICTR in Brief,” The ICTR in Brief | United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
accessed April 10, 2020, https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal)
29
“The ICTR in Brief.”
30
“The ICTR in Brief.”
31
Akayesu, (Amended Indictment), 17 June 1997, paras. 6-8.
32
Muvunyi, (Indictment), 22 December 2003.
33
Nahimana et al, (Judgment and Sentence), 3 December 2003.
34
Kamuhanda, (Indictment), 27 September 1999.
35
Kayishema et al. (Amended Indictment), 29 April 1996.
36
Muhimana, (Indictment), 3 February 2004.
28
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conspiracy to commit genocide, and crimes against humanity for his role in
extermination.37
As with all crimes tried before international courts or tribunals, the norms,
customs, and jurisdiction of the international law community dictate whether an
individual or state can be held responsible for their actions. Both the ICTY and the ICTR
were guided by principles outlined in the Genocide Convention with mirroring structure
and language. Article 4 of the ICTY Statute and Article 2 of the ICTR Statute match the
language of Article 3 of the Genocide Convention. The mirroring language and
subsequent case law establish jurisprudence on genocide.
In the case of Mikaeli Muhimana before the ICTR, the Tribunal acknowledged
that Rwanda was party to the Genocide Convention as it was signed on February 12,
1975.38 In other cases before the ICTR, the accused admitted that Rwanda was a party to
the genocide during the period of the one-hundred-day massacre.39 Article 2 states, “1.
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons
committing genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this article or of committing any of the
other acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this article.”40 These two paragraphs borrow
from Article 2 and 3 of the Genocide Convention. Article II of the ICTR Statute’s
language allows for case law comparisons on the prosecution of media incited genocide
in Rwanda and beyond.

37

Seromba, (Indictment), 5 July 2007.
Muhimana, (Trial Chamber), 28 April 2005, para. 492.
39
Kamuhanda, (Judgment), 22 January 2004, para. 576.
40
UN Security Council, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (as last amended on 13
October 2006), 8 November 1994, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3952c.html [accessed
1 December 2019], [hereinafter ICTR Statute] Art. 2.
38

11

The ICTR made decisions based on the perceived intent of an individual to
commit genocide. In the case of Seromba, the tribunal found that genocide should be
interpreted by several markers.41 The most prominent markers included knowledge and
intent to commit genocide.42 Article 2 of the Statute defines intent to commit genocide as
“intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as
such.”43 By confirming intent as a punishable offense the Appeals Chamber recalls, “…in
addition to intent and knowledge as regards the material elements of the crime of
genocide, the mental element of the crime also requires that the perpetrator have acted
with the specific intent to destroy a protected group as such in whole or in part.”44
This thesis will look at intent as it relates to several key elements of genocide
outlined in Article 2(c) of the Genocide Convention. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTR
in Rutaganda mirrored the findings of the ICTY in Jelisic in the shared requirement for
the crime of genocide as “the intent to accomplish certain specific types of destruction
against a targeted group.45 The type of intent interpreted by both tribunals can be divided
into sections including proof through overt statements and proof with circumstantial
evidence.46 The intent to destroy has been interpreted broadly by the ICTR concerning
the infamous Media Case. The Appeals Chamber indicated, “genocide is a crime
requiring special intent, and… this intent may be proven through inference from the facts
and circumstances of a case,” in the case of Seromba before the ICTR.47

41

Seromba, (Judgment), 13 December 2006, para. 316.
Seromba, (Judgment), 13 December 2006, para. 319.
43
ICTR Statute Art. 2(2).
44
Seromba, (Judgment) 12 March 2008, para. 175.
45
Rutaganda, (Judgment), 26 May 2003, para. 524.
46
Akayesu, (Judgment), 2 September 1998, para. 548.
47
Seromba, (Judgment), 12 March 2008, para. 176.
42
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The intent is shown with overt statements that indicate premeditated direct and
public incitement. Often intent cannot be understood without cultural context, but overt
statements by a perpetrator demonstrate clear intent with the use of circumstantial
evidence. In Nahimana, et al. before the ICTR, the Tribunal writes, “the jurisprudence
accepts that in most cases genocidal intent will be proved by circumstantial evidence.”48
Intent is hard to discern outside of overt statements because mind-reading is impossible.
In Rutaganda, the Appeals Chamber argued, “in the absence of explicit, direct proof, the
dolus specialis may therefore be inferred from relevant facts and circumstances.49 The
harm resulting from an act intended to result in that harm constitutes dolus specialis or
reasonable inference from the totality of the evidence will confirm whether circumstantial
evidence supports the accusation made.
In Muvunyi, before the ICTR, the trial chamber agreed with the findings from
another case, Akayesu. The Trial Chamber noted, “…that in the absence of a confession
or other admission, it is inherently difficult to establish the genocidal intent of an
accused…the Chamber may make a valid inference about the mental state of the accused
on the basis of a number of factors.”50 These factors allow for an assessment of genocidal
intent. In Seromba before the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR, The Tribunal established
criteria for specific intent to commit genocide stating:
“…including but not limited to (a) the general context of the perpetration of other
culpable acts systematically directed against that same group, whether these acts
were committed by the same offender or by others, (b) the scale of atrocities
committed, (c) their general nature, (d) their execution in a region or a country,
(e) the fact that the victims were deliberately and systematically chosen on
account of their membership of a particular group, (f) the exclusion, in this regard,
of members of other groups, (g) the political doctrine which gave rise to the acts
48

Nahimana, et al., (Appeals Judgment), 28 November 2007, para. 524.
Rutaganda, (Judgement), 26 May 2003, para. 525.
50
Muvunyi, (Judgment), 12 September 2006, para. 480.
49
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which violate the very foundation of the group or considered as such by their
perpetrators.”51
The specific acts that fit within the factors clarified in Seromba include the physical
targeting of a group or of their property, derogatory language towards a targeted group,
and the type of weapons employed to inflict bodily harm. In the case of Seromba, he was
found to have targeted and destroyed the church with the intention of killing the Tutsis
seeking refuge inside.52
This approach is seen across ICTR rulings. These factors remain the same across
all decisions only adding stipulations that the number affected and scale of any attempt at
the destruction of a group.53 A plan or policy is not required to prove the intent of the
perpetrator, nor does the perpetrator need to play a key coordinating role. In Rutaganda,
the Appeals Chamber states the requirements for a defendant to be found guilty of the
crime specified in Article 2(3)(c) of the Statute as being if the intentional element or
mens rea is present.54 The mirroring language in the ICTR Statute to the Genocide
Convention enables a strict interpretation of direct and public incitement.
1.3 Direct and Public Incitement to Genocide
The definition of “public incitement” in civil law systems is “characterized by a
call for criminal action to a number of individuals in a public place or to members of the
general public at large by such means as the mass media, for example, radio or
television.”55 This interpretation clarifies that “direct” indicates a display of “audiovisual
communication” in a conspicuous location. This definition enables an application of
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direct and public incitement to the crime of genocide. Even though this employs a clear
explanation of “public” with the inclusion of mass media, this type of incitement does not
need to be successful to fulfill this definition. Whether the incitement to genocide was
“public” should be evaluated on the two factors explained by the Tribunal. In Akayesu,
the factors are noted as “the place where the incitement occurred and whether or not
assistance was selective or limited.”56
According to the Tribunal’s judgment in Akayesu, Rwanda was the first time after
Nuremberg in which the specific crime of direct and public incitement to genocide’s
punishment was actualized.57 The Akayesu Trial Chamber used definitions previously
included in the Genocide Convention and Article 2(3)(c) of the Statute. In this
interpretation, direct and public incitement means:
“directly provoking the perpetrator(s) to commit genocide, whether through
speeches, shouting, or threats uttered in public places at public gatherings, or
through the sale or dissemination, offer for sale or display of written or printed
matter in public places or at public gatherings, or through the public display of
placards or posters, or through any other means of audiovisual communication.”58
This definition has been used in other decisions rendered by the Tribunal in the
aforementioned cases such as Akayesu and Muvunyi. The above definition specifies what
the Tribunal and the international community considered public with little emphasis on
the direct aspect.
In the cases of Akayesu, Muvunyi, and Nahimana et al., the Chamber affirmed
that the drafters intended the Genocide Convention to criminalize public incitement and
establish what may be considered private types of incitement. In Muvunyi before the
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ICTR Trial Chamber, there is a stipulation stating, “there is no requirement that the
incitement message be addressed to a certain number of people or that it should be
carried through a specific medium such as radio, television, or a loudspeaker.”59 While
there is no requirement that the message promoting incitement be broadcast, the scope of
influence is an important element in applying the standard of context to interpretation.
In Nahimana et al., before the Tribunal, the Chamber dismissed Appellant
Negeze’s argument “that the genocide would have occurred even if the Kangura
newspaper articles had never existed, because it is not necessary to show that direct and
public incitement to commit genocide was followed by actual consequences.”60 In other
cases such as Akayesu, the Tribunal found that there existed a causal relationship
between the defendant’s speech that enabled further widespread extermination of Tutsis.
The Chamber noted that this type of relationship was not necessary to establish
incitement to genocide.61 The Chamber states, it is the potential of the communication to
cause genocide that makes it incitement. When this potential is realized, a crime of
genocide as well as incitement to genocide has occurred.”62
Nahimana, et al. provides the legal precedent necessary within the confines of an
international tribunal for future adjudication of media incited genocide. The Chamber
noted, “in considering whether particular expression constitutes a form of incitement on
which restrictions would be justified, the international jurisprudence does not include any
specific causation requirement linking the expression at issue with the demonstration of a
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direct effect.”63 The chamber also noted in this instance that editors and publishers have
typically been held accountable for the source of media they control. In this case, the
Tribunal emphasizes the intent of those who control the source when determining the
scope:
“In determining the scope of this responsibility, the importance of intent, that is the
purpose of the communications they channel, emerges from the jurisprudence—
whether or not the purpose in publicly transmitting the material was of a bona fide
nature (e.g. historical research, the dissemination of news and information, the public
accountability of government authorities).”64
In other words, the actual language used in the media has often been linked to a
defendants’ intent to commit genocide. In this instance, the Appeals Chamber was not
satisfied that the occurrence of genocide demonstrated that journalists, broadcasters, and
individuals in Rwanda who had control of media sources had the necessary intent to
commit genocide.
The decision rendered in this case helps to set the precedent for future cases such
as the adjudication of Myanmar for crimes committed against Rohingya Muslims.
Placing liability on the journalists and editors who disperse inciting language through
mass media sources such as radio or newspapers before the ICTR, sets forth the
necessary guidelines with regard to the intent of the speaker. This framework will allow
courts to use the definitions for situational context and public to apply a narrower
definition to crimes committed.
1.4 Hate Speech
Addressing the strengths and weaknesses of international customs and norms on
the regulation of hate speech, a definition encompassing hate speech is necessary. The
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definition used by the ICCPR offers suitable standards for the consistent criminal
prohibition on hate speech. The term hate speech here refers to any type of speech that
promotes racism or any other acts enumerated in the ICCPR. The United Nations (UN)
provides clarity on hate speech crimes by affirming in Article 20 of the ICCPR that “any
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”65 This language is
precise and coherent when combined with existing international customary law.
While this does not explicitly refer to hate speech, the definition above indicates
the intrinsic qualities of human beings that should be free of discrimination. The
conclusion reached by the Chamber in conjunction with the travaux préparatoires to the
Genocide Convention states, “in most cases, direct and public incitement to commit
genocide can be preceded or accompanied by hate speech, but only direct and public
incitement is prohibited under Article 2(3)(c) of the Statute.”66 This distinction helps to
preserve the right to freedom of expression.
Toby Mendel, in his chapter, Does International Law Provide for Consistent
Rules on Hate Speech?, asserts that the terminology of the ICCPR is suitable for criminal
adjudication.67 Despite the suitability of the text, Mendel’s chapter recognizes that the
international courts have not provided clear interpretations of the hate speech rules in the
ICCPR.68 The interpretations of hate speech are limited due to the jurisdiction of military
tribunals and international courts. Whether the necessary parties have ratified the
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Genocide Convention and other relevant texts place constraints on the ability of a tribunal
or court to hold a responsible party accountable for incitement to genocide as a separate
crime. The modern institutions today lack the enforcement power to hold the states who
have ratified treaties to the decision made by the courts.
The key standards in the ICCPR provide for a more uniform framework within
international law as 165 states have ratified the document. 69 Articles 19 and 20 of the
ICCPR are intrinsically linked together to consistently apply standards for freedom of
expression while protecting the interests of the public. Article 19 guarantees the right to
express oneself freely and the narrow definition of Article 20 works together to allow
nations to adopt individual laws against hate speech. This is possible while still
respecting the legal framework created by the ICCPR.70
The allowance for freedom of expression helps to make clear rulings in the case
of the ICTR and sets the precedent for the future. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTR
opined in the case of Nahimana that:
“the Trial Chamber did not confuse mere hate speech with direct incitement to
commit genocide. Moreover, it was correct in holding that the context is a factor to
consider in deciding whether discourse constitutes direct incitement to commit
genocide. For these reasons, the Appeals Chamber concludes that the Trial Chamber
committed no error with respect to the notion of direct incitement to commit
genocide.”71
Nahimana et al. considered the difference between hate speech in general and using the
same language to incite discrimination or violence against a targeted group on the one
hand, and direct and public incitement to commit genocide as it is referred to in Article
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2(2) of the ICTR Statute on the other.72 In the Appeals Chamber for Nahimana et al., the
Chamber discerned the difference: “direct incitement to commit genocide assumes that
the speech is a direct appeal to commit an act referred to in Article 2(2) of the Statute; it
has to be more than a mere vague or indirect suggestion.”73 The distinction separates hate
speech and direct and public incitement to commit genocide. The allowance of freedom
of expression distinguishes the language based on the intent of the speaker to protect
speech under other agreements such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR).
An important component in using Article 2 of the ICTR Statute to establish
jurisprudence on the prosecution of genocide is confirming whether the individual
responsible took part in a targeted attack using language consistent with hate speech.
Throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, many examples varying from low to high
extremes have demonstrated what could be interpreted as hate speech in society. These
examples include the language used against the Jewish, Tutsi, and Rohingya peoples in
addition to less violent hate speech found on social media today.
The purpose of the speech used is a contributing factor to all decisions rendered
by the Tribunal. Before the Appeals Chamber in Nahimana et al., the Tribunal affirmed:
“The principal consideration is thus the meaning of the words used in the specific
context: it does not matter that the message may appear ambiguous to another
audience or in another context. On the other hand, if the discourse is still
ambiguous even when considered in context, it cannot be found beyond
reasonable doubt to constitute direct and public incitement to genocide.”74
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The same case indicated the importance of considering the context of the speech. The
Appeals Chamber of the ICTR said that the cases of Streicher and Fritzsche before
Nuremberg could not adequately demonstrate that a strict interpretation of discourse
applied to all cases where claims of direct and public incitement to genocide occurred.75
The Appeals Chamber left the ability to interpret the context in cases of direct and public
incitement ambiguous.76 In Nahimana, et al. before the Tribunal, the Chamber stated,
“[The Appeals Chamber] is of the opinion that the purpose of the speech is indisputably a
factor in determining whether there is direct and public incitement to commit genocide
…”77 Factors contributing to a contextual analysis include the purpose of such speech,
political or community affiliation of the speaker, and the situational application of the
words.78
The purpose of the speech by the speaker or author illustrates the result or causal
relationship intended. While the case law is not fully clear, the previous cases establish
that overt statements and circumstantial evidence can help prove the intent of the
perpetrator in the absence of explicit evidence. The political and community affiliation of
the perpetrator is integral to the application of this rule. In cases such as the Rwandan
Tutsis, who experienced targeted attacks based on ethnical and national relations, this
factor plays a crucial role in the prosecution. In the case of Nahimana et al, the Appeals
Chamber notes:
”…that the relevant issue is not whether the author of the speech is from the majority
ethnic group or supports the government’s agenda…on the other hand, it recognizes
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that the political or community affiliation of the author of a speech may be regarded
as a contextual element which can assist in its interpretation.”79
The contextual inference is emphasized in all cases presented before the ICTR. The
application of the words varies with the method of dispersal. The type of messages and
modes of dispersal will be further discussed in later chapters.
1.5 The ICC’s Rome Statute
The most recent international legal instrument to address genocide is the
International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute. It draws from the language in the
Genocide Convention and the ICCPR on the crime and punishment of genocide similarly
to the ICTR Statute without the same prohibition on incitement.80 The full efficacy of
previous decisions rendered from Nuremberg to the ICTR on the crime of incitement to
genocide has been undermined by the Rome Statute. The Rome Stature treats incitement
as a mode of criminal participation in genocide, not as a separate crime in its own right.81
By doing this any type of decision made by the ICC on incitement to genocide will face
rather stringent requirements. The ICC’s Rome Statute as it is today does not have the
necessary language to draw from the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR on the crime
of direct and public incitement to genocide to regulate hate speech.
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Chapter Two: Rwanda
This thesis will use Rwanda for case study analysis because of three factors.
Firstly, the use of media in transmitting incitement before and during the genocide
occurred. Secondly, the jurisprudence established by the ICTR on the crime of direct and
public incitement to genocide in the case Nahimana et al. And lastly, the colonial
influence on Rwanda by Belgium parallels to the colonial influence on Myanmar by
Britain examined in later chapters. By using a historical timeline to show the evolution
from word to action and its impact on the eventual Rwandan Genocide. To do this the
seminal case on direct and public incitement to genocide that resulted from this conflict
and involved leaders of mass media sources Nahimana et al. (Media Case) will be used to
establish legal precedent for the following case study example, Myanmar today.
2.1 History of the Conflict
Rwanda, one of the smallest countries on the African mainland, is bordered by
Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.82 Formerly,
Rwanda operated as a Belgian colony until 1962. At the onset of independence, the
nation was divided between three groups. These groups consist of eighty-four percent
Hutu, fifteen percent Tutsi and one percent Twa.83 During the period of Rwanda’s history
governed by Belgium, the Hutu majority came to resent the Tutsis. With the end of the
colonial era in Rwanda, the highly privileged minority distinct from the rest of the
population and preferred by Europeans, the Tutsis, took control. Ethnic and racial
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distinctions serve as two of the major factors in political upheaval.84 M. Catharine
Newbury explains the role of political centralization and colonialism stating, “Through
superior force, prestige, and wealth, the colonial powers persuaded and often coerced the
incumbent elite (Arabs in Zanzibar, Tutsis in Rwanda) to serve as intermediaries for
colonial administration.”85 Through dependence on the colonial authority, the incumbent
elite, Tutsis, obtained more effective power.86 The European preference for the Tutsis
stemmed from the hierarchal system imposed that preferred more European or Aryan
features.87 After a series of pogroms were unleashed in 1963, the assumption of power by
the Hutu majority furthered crisis and displacement. Many Tutsis fled to the Central
African Great Lake’s region finding safety in Uganda. Those in exile established the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) which would go on to lead a military invasion of Rwanda
in 1990.88
In the early days of the First Republic, the first independent government of
Rwanda was marked by ethnic confrontations. During the transitional period, the Tutsis
became victims as they were viewed as members of the historically elite ruling class.89
The one-party government system was led by Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour
le Développement (MRND). In the amended indictment of Nahimana, et. al before the
ICTR, the Tribunal notes, “From 1973 to 1994, the government of President
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Habyarimana used a system of ethnic and regional quotas which was supposed to provide
educational and employment opportunities for all but was increasingly used to
discriminate against both Tutsis and Hutus from regions outside the northwest.”90 This
level of systematic discrimination fostered resentment among different ethnic groups.
In addition to the systematic discrimination endured by Tutsis, the rising
importance and influence of the president’s inner circle Akazu begin to threaten the Tutsi
population. This group of supporters was almost exclusively comprised of ethnic Hutus,
supplemented only by individuals who shared the same extremist Hutu ideology and
origin as President Habyarimana.91 The aftermath of the ethnic confrontation and
President Habyarimana’s regime served as a Petri dish for the growing industry of “hate
media” in Rwanda that benefited the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM),
Radio Rwanda, and the Kangura during the genocide.92 The rhetoric and systematic
discrimination used by President Habyarimana’s regime was a large factor in allowing
hate media to grow.
On October 1, 1990, President Habyarimana permitted the introduction of
multiple political parties and the adoption of a new constitution the following year on
June 10, 1991. This first transitional government remained dominated by MRND
members due to the refusal of the largest opposition parties to participate. This first
transitional government helped reinforce a feeling of betrayal and resentment in those
with extremist Hutu ideological beliefs. The second transitional government formed in
April 1992 would be the first time the MRND had minority representation in the national
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government. Even with the inclusion of more political parties on the national stage, the
MRND maintained dominance over local governments.93 This new government entered
into negotiations with the RPF which resulted in the signing of the Arusha Accords on
August 4, 1993.94
The terms of the Arusha Accords provided for the combination of both sides’
armed forces. The new national army was intended to include only 13,000 men consisting
of sixty percent FAR (Forces Armées Rwandaises) and forty percent RPF. The two sides
were meant to equitably distribute command posts. This equitable distribution was
intended to assuage fears of one party’s dominance over another. In addition to this new
separation of powers, the Accords limited the number of ministerial portfolios the MRND
could hold. The new government’s ministerial portfolios would be split between MRND
and other parties. The Accords restricted the MRND to no more than five ministerial
portfolios including the presidency. The main aim of the Arusha Accords was to reach an
agreement with all sides and combat any political ideology based on ethnic differences.
The political forces participating in the transitional governments accepted a proposal to
abstain from all violence including the incitement of violence.95
A notable inclusion of the Accords is the allotment for a UN peacekeeping
mission, UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) which was tasked with
monitoring implementation of the new transitional government. The Hutu extremists who
felt disenfranchised by this new agreement would soon have the necessary catalyst for
ethnic cleansing.96 On April 6, 1994, Juvénal Habyarimana, the President of Rwanda died
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in a questionable plane crash triggering widespread chaos and almost immediate
genocide. Human Rights Watch reported the murders of an initial estimate between
200,000 and 500,000 unarmed and unresisting civilians.97
President Habyarimana supported a campaign of violence against Tutsis, the
minority ethnic group.98 The president and other Rwandan authorities encouraged a
systematic massacre through various methods including instructions to individual
political party militias such as the Impuzamugambi and the Interahamwe.99 Interahamwe
meaning those work together or attack together.100 To avoid the power-sharing dictated
by the Arusha Accords, several prominent civilian and military figures pursued a strategy
of ethnic division and violence encouraged by the level of training received by militias.101
The militias cannot be held individually responsible. Human Rights Watch Reported that
in attacks involving civilians, the militias were often led by soldiers or national
policemen. The militias killed far more people than uniformed members of the armed
forces, but the leadership provided by government-sanctioned training enabled efficient,
systematic extermination.102
The three most prominent sources of media in Rwanda before and during the
genocide were RTLM, and Radio Rwanda and Kangura. The RTLM began in July 1993.
Several witnesses brought forth by the prosecution in Nahimana et al. emphasized the
importance of the radio in everyday Rwandans lives by pointing out that young people
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could often be found carrying radios down the street.103 Several hundred of the RTLM’s
broadcasts were introduced into evidence and proved that several broadcasts had raised
the issue of ethnicity that served as calls to action.104 In addition to the RTLM, Radio
Rwanda would play a key role. In one interview given in June 1994, Ngeze explicitly
refers to the crimes committed at roadblocks. The crimes included the targeting of
members of society that the RPF had not been able to kill.105
Before the one-hundred-day genocide, one of the most prominent hate speech
mouthpieces was a written extremist Hutu magazine called Kangura, meaning “wake
them up” or “wake it up” in English. Kangura was formed by Hassan Ngeze in 1990 and
became a prominent publication. With the first publication in May 1990 and lastly in
1995, Kangura served as a mouthpiece for dangerous rhetoric. Although there was a
hiatus in the publication in 1994, the prosecution of Nahimana et al.’s expert witness
Marcel Kabanda pointed to this publication as a well-known source of information for
Rwandans.106 These media sources played a role in the genocide with the type of
language used to incite others to join the cause.
2.2 Role of Media in the Rwandan Genocide
To best clarify the importance of the shift in language and programming promoted
by Radio Rwanda and later RTLM, this section will engage with a before and during
analysis. The radio was used to disseminate propaganda and hate speech in accordance
with a genocidal end solution. Gregory Gordon emphasizes the role of individuals in the
decision-making process for the information aired by both Radio Rwanda and RTLM.
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The individuals in control of this technology viewed President Habyarimana as a
sellout.107 Gordon notes the impact of Ferdinand Nahimana on the pogroms against the
Tutsi in March 1992 in the Bugesera region of the Kigali prefecture which has been
viewed as the final rehearsal before the genocide.108 Nahimana, a former university
professor who was then head of the government agency, instructed Radio Rwanda to air
an invented report based on misconstrued information. He declared that the Tutsis had
compiled a “hit list” of Hutus to exterminate in the Bugesera region.109 This type of
intentional misinformation suggests an intent to direct and public incitement of genocide.
The commitment of the political forces behind the Arusha Accords to refrain from
incitement failed to ensure long term results. This can be shown by the different types of
media messages transmitted throughout Rwanda. The lead up to genocide can be
separated into campaigns of hate speech and campaigns for genocide. There exists a
distinct shift from hate speech into direct incitement to genocide. Human Rights Watch
notes that by the end of 1993, the broadcasts began shifting into the rhetoric found during
the genocide. The messages became more virulent and began targeting individuals who
became known as “enemies,” “traitors,” or ones “who deserved to die.”
Kangura published pieces such as the Hutu ten commandments not long after the
RPF’s military invasion.110 Gregory Gordon notes that these commandments enforced
Hutu solidarity against a common enemy, the Tutsi. This definition can be increased by
adding that anyone who persecutes his brother Hutu by abstaining from spreading the
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Hutu ideology is an enemy, one of the Hutu Commandments.111 Types of imagery used to
create ethnic tension include the cover of issue No. 26 published in November 1991. This
cover depicted Rwanda’s first post-independence president, who presided over the period
of initial mass violence. The imagery was clear to Rwanda who understood the allusion
to the previous Hutu uprising that overthrew the Tutsi monarchy.112 A clear example of
individual targeting is the murder of Lando Ndasingwa, Minister of Labor and Social
Affairs. He was one of the first victims along with his mother, wife, and his children
whose names were broadcast before their eventual murder.113 These precursors to conflict
help to apply the legal standard of direct and incitement to genocide.
The language used both in this publication and also the RTLM and Radio Rwanda
included inyenzi and inkotanyi. In the context of the Rwanda genocide, the term inyenzi
or cockroaches refers to the group of refugees that set up a new regime in 1959. This term
refers to the perceived necessity to conquer the inyenzi.114 This references the revolution
by which the Hutus conquered the Tutsis and retook the land. The rhetoric used often
repeated the phrase, “to conquer the inyenzi once and for all.”115 Other terms used
include the Inkotanyi which refers to the Tutsi and their accomplices.116
The messages used by RTLM before and during the active genocide changed
dramatically. By separating the messages into categories, it becomes easier to illustrate
the campaign for genocide (see table 1). These categories are referenced in the Judgement
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and Sentence of Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al. before the ICTR. In the Tribunal’s ruling,
Judge Naventhem Pillay stated:
“The Chamber accepts that this moment in time (the downing of the airplane on
April 6) served as a trigger for the events that followed. That is evident. But if the
downing of the plane was the trigger, then RTLM and Kangura were the bullets
in the gun. The trigger had such a deadly impact because the gun was loaded. The
Chamber therefore considers the killing of Tutsi civilians can be said to have
resulted, at least in part, from the message of ethnic targeting for death that was
clearly and effectively disseminated through RTLM and Kangura before and after
6 April 1994.” 117
By asserting the connection between the media and the actual events of genocide, the
ICTR established legal precedent for future ad hoc tribunals and international courts. By
picking up fifty years after the judgments rendered at Nuremberg, the ICTR differentiates
between permissible speech and illegal incitement in the cases of Kangura and RTLM.118
Table 1. Categories of RTLM Messages Before and During the Genocide
Before the Genocide
1. Trying generally to create animosity
toward Tutsis
2. Equating the terms inyenzi and
inkotanyi with Tutsis in general
3. Acknowledging its own reputation as
anti-Tutsi and inciting hatred toward
Tutsis
4. Launching specific verbal attacks
against Tutsis

During the Genocide
1. Calling for the extermination of all
Tutsis
2. Reporting the extermination had
taken place and praising it
3. Calling for attacks on the remaining
skeletal UNAMIR force
4. Downplaying or urging concealment
of the extermination

Source: Gregory S. Gordon, Atrocity Speech Law: Foundation, Fragmentation, and
Fruition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 55.
The descriptions above will be beneficial in the further chapter in displaying the gradient
between positive and negatively connotated messages. The type of messaging described
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above can be placed along the gradient to demonstrate the jump from word to action. The
messages above align with negatively connotated aggression.
2.3 The Media’s Role in Incitement
The decisions rendered by the ICTR resumed where the Nuremberg judgment
stopped nearly fifty years prior.119 The decisions made in the Akayesu case before the
ICTR laid the legal groundwork for incitement and individual culpability.120 In Akayesu,
the Tribunal’s inclusion of individual responsibility helped enforce a consistent legal
precedent in all cases.121 Decisions made between Akayesu and the infamous Media Case
helped strengthen the definition of incitement.122 Gregory Gordon clarifies the two
analytic criteria established for use by the ICTR with the statement, “…the purpose of the
speech appeared to be advocacy of ethnic consciousness.”123 This clarified the difference
between permissible speech and illegal incitement in the instances of Kangura and
RTLM.124
In this case, the Appeals Chamber was not satisfied that the simple occurrence of
genocide demonstrated that journalists, broadcasters, and individuals in Rwanda who had
the control of media sources had the necessary intent to commit genocide.125 The
Chamber did not rule out the possibility that the individuals could have intended to incite
others and that the encouragement via mass media sources contributed to the massacre of
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the Tutsi population. Furthermore, the Chamber notes that the genocide could have been
the result of other factors outside of the control of Appellants.126
The ICTR only had the necessary jurisdiction to prosecute offenses committed in
1994. In the Appeals Chamber before the Tribunal, the Chamber recalls, “…even where
offenses may have commenced before 1994 and continued in 1994, the provisions of the
Statute on the temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal mean that a conviction may be based
only on criminal conduct having occurred during 1994.”127 Therefore, any perpetrators
could only be held accountable and prosecuted for acts including direct and public
incitement to commit genocide during 1994 and not the months leading up to conflict in
1993.128
The link between verbal and written conduct and atrocity in Rwanda proved that
speech-related international crimes would play a key role in the outcome of the ICTR.129
The legal precedents set by the Tribunal continue to aid in the prosecution and regulation
of media incited crimes today. In the case of Rwanda, the Tribunal noted the necessity of
taking into account the nation’s language and culture in ascertaining whether the speech
in RTLM and Kangura during the one-hundred-day civil war constituted direct
incitement to commit genocide. This is significant because the purpose behind the
language used should be considered to determine the reach and understanding of the
incitement to genocide. The Tribunal stated in Nahimana et al.:
“The culture, including the nuances of Kinyarwanda language, should be considered
in determining what constitutes direct and public incitement to commit genocide in
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Rwanda. For this reason, it may be helpful to examine how a speech was understood
by its intended audience in order to determine its true message.”130
The primary concern with analyzing hate speech and its role in direct and public
incitement to genocide is understanding how the intended audience interpreted the
language.
The conclusion reached in the Appeals Chamber in Nahimana et al., established
how the broadcasts by RTLM must be considered in their entirety and within the context
of the broader conflict. The Appeals Chamber stated, “thus, even though the terms
Inyenzi and Inkotanyi may have various meanings in various contexts (as with many
words in every language) …the Appeals Chamber further considers that it was reasonable
to conclude that certain RTLM broadcasts had directly equated the Tutsi with the
enemy.”131 Viewing the language in the context of history is key to an accurate
interpretation.
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Chapter Three: Myanmar
This chapter examines the role of present-day Myanmar in furthering the
hierarchal differences established in the post-colonial era by former Burma. This chapter
explains how the continued struggles between ethnic groups and the intervention by
colonial powers led to large scale conflict. This chapter will conclude with the overview
of the proceedings brought forth by The Gambia at the ICJ and what that means for
Myanmar. The case brought forth by The Gambia in front of the ICJ helps argue for the
treatment of incitement to genocide as a separate crime.
3.1 History of the Conflict
Muslim populations have existed in the area known as Arakan, a coastal plain,
connecting Bangladesh to the area presently known as Myanmar.132 The fifteenth-century
presence of Muslim titles used by Arakanese kings suggests long term presence and
influence on the region from Muslims. The percentage of the population that identifies as
Muslim has varied through the decades and research suggests a complex picture.133 The
history of this area sits at the center of ethnic claims raised by the Rohingya in the midtwentieth century. The early modern Buddhist kingdom of Arakan established a large
Buddhist presence.134 The contemporary ethnocultural identities and rivalries cannot be
understood without background on the counterclaims and the rise of a Muslim Nationalist
Movement in 1942-1964.135 Overall demographic growth during the colonial period of
1881 until 1941 demonstrates a steady growth to twenty-seven percent of the
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population.136 This helps explain the modern roles of Muslim and Buddhist communities
in the Rakhine State. The modern state of Myanmar has ethnic struggles between
Muslim and Buddhist communities that have resulted in the beginnings of genocide.
Jacques Leider states that no information exists on the social, political, and
religious organizations of Muslims in North Arakan during the colonial period of 1881 to
1941. According to Leider, Muslims became politically active only in the aftermath of
World War II in Burma. With the arrival of the Japanese in Burma in 1942, a refugee
crisis with more than 400,000 Indians crossing the Arakan to reach Bengal served as a
force for political awakening in Muslim communities. With the arrival of the Japanese,
there was a forced exodus that aided in a collapse of the colonial order.137 This collapse
influenced an anti-colonial Burma Independence Army (BIA), consisting of Arakanese
Buddhists, to attack Muslim villages whose inhabitants were either driven away or killed.
As with most ethno-based conflicts, Arakanese Buddhists were targeted in retaliation in
predominantly Muslim areas. These early conflicts helped to form differing claims of
injustice and victimhood and have aided the sustained bitterness of future generations. 138
By 1949, Burma was the center of a civil war. In North Arakan, the Mujahid
insurrection, which lasted for more than a decade, caused “the violent exactions of local
militias, the dissatisfaction of local landlords, the unfair treatment of Muslims by
Arakanese administrators, and murky business conflicts.”139 Allegedly the Mujahid
claimed to fight on behalf of an autonomous Muslim area, but not even modern Muslim
nationalist supporters invoke this model for a national cause in the present day. Later
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during the 1950s, a younger generation of Arakan Muslims brought a nationalist
movement to the forefront of the region. These Muslim leaders and students in North
Arakan asserted a new cohesive ethnoreligious identity for the region’s Muslim
population. This unsatisfied generation sought to affirm a singular national identity by
pushing for the adoption of a common name, Rohingya.140 The rise of Muslim identity in
Myanmar can be elucidated with a discourse on the term Rohingya. This term aimed to
separate the Muslim population from the majority Buddhist population in Burma, later
Myanmar. “Rohingya” results from the ongoing process to unify Muslims in this region
with a similar cultural profile, but a diverse historical background. The new terminology
aided identity formation in Muslim communities across the North Arakan Region and
adjacent communities in Bangladesh and India.141
3.2 Rohingya in Modern Times
While this community works towards the formation of their identity, Myanmar
officials reject Rohingya as ethnicity and any related colonial claims for Rohingya
emancipation. Rohingya leaders have used evidence of Muslim communities in the
colonial period as a support for the claim for an autonomous Muslim state in the North
Arakan region, Myanmar officials face steep obstacles in denying emancipation for
Rohingyas due in part to their large population. According to the 2014 Myanmar census
nearly one-third of the Rakhine State’s three million residents identify as Rohingya. As of
2020, there are more than 43 million total residing within Myanmar’s borders.142
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The Rohingya minority reportedly make up one million of the Maungdaw,
Buthidaung, and Rathedaung townships. The townships are the organizational structure
of local governments inside of Myanmar. In addition to the population density in these
areas another one million Rohingya reside outside of Myanmar.143 Because those living
in other areas, outside of Myanmar have different migration backgrounds and live
primarily as refugees with semi-illegal identities, the ethnic cleansing and genocide
referenced in this thesis do not necessarily encompass those outside Myanmar’s borders.
Even though over one-third of the population identify as Rohingya, the majority
population of the Rakhine State consists of Buddhist Rakhine or Arakanese who are
ethnically similar to the Bamar or Burmans.144
In 2008, Myanmar’s military government developed a new constitution and held
general elections in 2010 with the hope for normal relations with the international
community. When the initial violence in the Rakhine State began with the alleged rape
and murder of a Buddhist woman by three Rohingya men, pamphlets circulated by local
Rakhine activists arguing that the Rohingya were to blame and called for retribution. At
the same time, anonymous internet users circulated photos of the Buddhist woman’s body
on the internet, with a call to seek retribution against all Muslims in Myanmar. During
this online campaign, Government newspapers used the term “Muslim Kala,” a localized
term used to lump all Muslims into a group with the use of a derogatory word for SouthAsians.145
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This call for retribution was successful as it incited a mob of three hundred
Rakhine citizens to surround a bus filled with Muslim travelers at a checkpoint in
Toungop. With witnesses in the hundreds, the mob forced ten Muslims into the street
where they were beaten to death. After this massacre, violence spread rapidly across the
Rakhine State. In Maungdaw, Rohingya rioted following prayer with at least seven
reported Rakhine deaths. Less than two weeks later, then President Thein Sein was forced
to declare a state of emergency in the Rakhine State giving administrative authority to the
military. Even with enforced curfews and banned public gatherings, Human Rights
Watch reported more than 100,000 displaced Rohingya and Rakhine living in tents within
temporary camps.146 The state of emergency in the Rakhine enhanced the presence of the
military and other security forces. The forces claimed to search for criminals; however,
these forces performed sweeps through predominantly Muslim communities supporting
claims of discrimination. These sweeps would result in arbitrary arrests which served
only to inflame existing ethnocultural tension.147
3.3 Social Media’s Role in Incitement
The role of social media in local politics began to be a point of international
discussion in 2018 with the publication of a possible genocide by multiple Western news
sources including The New York Times.148 In one article, Paul Mozur notes that the
messages appearing on Facebook’s platform. Posts stating that Islam was a global threat
to Buddhism and the spread of the rape of a Buddhist woman by military personnel that
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has turned to social media to perpetuate ethnic cleansing. The military exploited the
widespread capability of the platform by disseminating information to the eighteen
million residents of Myanmar who use the internet. The posts made by senior military
officials were taken down by Facebook; however, there still exists a propaganda
campaign hidden behind false names and sham accounts. According to The New York
Times, Facebook confirmed that a series of accounts had been removed due to their
connection with Myanmar’s military. These accounts were estimated to have a reach of
over 1.3 million followers.149 While Myanmar’s government was attempting to influence
the opinions of their residents, such measures have gained the attention of nations all over
the world resulting in criticism.
3.4 The International Court of Justice and The Republic of the Gambia
While the present ethnocultural tensions between the two groups extend from
state policies excluding one group, both groups contribute to the lasting regional conflict.
Violence and discrimination in the region did not arise with the invention of the term
Rohingya but as a result of history and state-sanctioned discrimination. Since 1980,
Myanmar’s military and authoritarian government have denied Rohingyas intrinsic
human rights including citizenship.150 The term Rohingya became known outside the
region with reports of human rights violations against Muslims in the North Rakhine
State during the 1990s and again in 2012. Access to information via the internet has made
the Rohingya crisis globally accessible increasing the likelihood other states might
intervene. Worldwide reports have called the Rohingyas’ a “stateless victims of
systematic oppression, whose refugee status and disenfranchisement are defining
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elements of their public identity.”151 The level of human rights violations and the spread
of hate speech in the region could aid in inciting others to commit genocide.
This description aids the claims brought forth by a fellow global south state, The
Republic of the Gambia (The Gambia). When hundreds of thousands of Rohingya fled to
Bangladesh after military operations widely interpreted as ethnic cleansing, the Rohingya
Crisis gained prominence as an issue for post-dictatorial Myanmar in 2011.152 The scale
of the refugee crisis prompted the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to
acknowledge that certain elements of genocide may be occurring in the Rakhine State of
Myanmar.153 This issue was brought to the attention of other international authorities
with varying levels of demand to hold Myanmar accountable for their actions.
International media outlets produced an analysis of the situation from the ground. Outlets
like CBS News have commented on the role of social media in the spread of violence
across the Rakhine State.154 Journalists in Myanmar noticed the necessity of cell phones
to receive outside news. Independent Analysts say that the satellite imaging shows that at
least 340 villages, not houses, have been destroyed.155 International coverage on the scale
of these atrocities led to the proceedings instituted in November 2019.
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On November 11, 2019, The Gambia filed an Application Instituting Proceedings
and Request for Provisional Measures against The Republic of the Union of Myanmar.156
In the document addressed to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), The
Gambia stated:
“…This Application concerns acts adopted, taken and condoned by the
Government of Myanmar against members of the Rohingya group, a distinct
ethnic, racial and religious group that resides primarily in Myanmar’s Rakhine
State. These acts, which include killing, causing serious bodily and mental harm,
inflicting conditions that are calculated to bring about physical destruction,
imposing measures to prevent births, and forcible transfers, are genocidal in
character because they are intended to destroy the Rohingya group in whole or in
part.”157
The Gambia alleges that Myanmar has breached and will continue to breach the
Genocide Convention under Articles 1, 3(a), 3(b), 3(c), and 3(e), 4, 5, and 6. The Gambia
argues that Myanmar must commit to reparations to the displaced Rohingya communities
and the allowance for “safe and dignified” return with full citizenship and protection of
human rights.158 Furthermore, The Gambia takes note of the jurisprudence of the ICJ in
addition to other courts or tribunals such as the ICTR and ICTY.159 The inclusion of other
internationally recognized bodies in their application gives strength to the claims brought
forth by The Gambia.
In Article 1 of the Genocide Convention, the contracting parties confirmed that
whether a nation commits genocide during a time of peace or war remains a crime under
international law.160 The Gambia asserts that Myanmar meets at least one of the five acts
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considered to be genocide in Article 2 of the Genocide Convention. The Gambia’s
allegations refer to October 2016 military operations conducted both by Myanmar’s
government and outside security forces. The systematic acts referred to by The Gambia
indicate that:
“during the course of which they committed mass murder, rape and other forms of
sexual violence, and engaged in the systematic destruction by fire of Rohingya
villages, often with inhabitants locked inside burning houses, with the intent to
destroy the Rohingya as a group, in whole or in part.”161
The Gambia affirms that from August 2017 onward, Myanmar resumed genocidal acts
referenced as “clearance operations” on a larger stage.162 The lawsuit’s attribution of
responsibility to the leaders of the government serves as justification on why those
perpetuating genocide in Myanmar can be held to the same legal standard as the
individuals brought before the ICTR and ICTY.163
Traditionally, global south nations have not been involved in bringing cases
against fellow global south nations. The Gambia presenting a case against Myanmar for
violations of the Genocide Convention represents a significant move for a tiny nation of
only 7 million.164 Theoretically, the United Nations holds all member states equal;
however, this is not always the case in practice. As Myanmar is not a party to the Rome
Statute, the claims made by The Gambia cannot be presented before the ICC; however,
Article 8 of the Genocide Convention states:
“Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United
Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they
161
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consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any
of the other acts enumerated in article III.”165
With the support of Article 8 of the Genocide Convention, The Gambia concludes based
on the findings of the UN Human Rights Council’s Independent International FactFinding Mission (UN Fact-Finding Mission) that Myanmar’s escalation to violence
against the Rohingya can be classified as genocide and brought forth before the ICJ.166
3.5 Myanmar’s Reservations to the Genocide Convention
Even though The Gambia’s claims are supported by the Genocide Convention and
prior legal proceedings, Myanmar has reservations to the Genocide Convention on
Article 6 and 8. Article 6 states that the parties responsible for committing genocide may
be tried by a competent jury in their jurisdiction.167 Article 8 says that any competent
organs of the United Nations may take part in the prevention or suppression of acts of
genocide.168 Article 8 of the Genocide Convention, as defined above, would support
bringing the claims made by The Gambia before the ICJ if Myanmar did not have
reservations to the Genocide Convention.169
Reservations are provisions made usually upon the ratification of a document that
withholds some powers to the signatory state.170 These reservations inhibit what little
enforcement power the Genocide Convention has as a legal document. The Genocide
Convention intended to hold all contracting parties accountable, and it encouraged all
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nations to act as a watchdog for crimes of genocide in the aftermath of WWII. The
international community can no longer turn a conscious blind eye to genocide which is
evidenced by The Gambia a nation 7,000 miles away from the state it instituted legal
proceedings against.
The provisional order issued by the ICJ on January 23, 2020, offers four
unanimous provisional measures. In these measures the ICJ determines that despite
reservations Myanmar still has obligations under the Genocide Conventions, stating:
“The Republic of the Union of Myanmar shall, in accordance with its obligations
under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, in relation to the members of the Rohingya group in its territory, take
all measures within its power to prevent the commission of all acts within the
scope of Article II of this Convention…”171
The decision rendered by the ICJ argues that Myanmar should be held responsible for
genocidal acts in line with the Genocide Convention. The court’s order to, “…take
effective measures to prevent the destruction and ensure the preservation of evidence
related to allegations of acts within the scope of Article 2 of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide…”172 lacks enforcement power,
however. Due to previous recognition of the ICJ’s authority, Myanmar’s obligation to
fulfill the court’s orders and decisions should not remain a legal question.173 But without
a physical presence within Myanmar’s borders, the ICJ’s orders have no lasting impact
on the conflict at large.
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Chapter Four: A Case for Incitement as a Separate Crime
The evolution of hate speech to genocide is a multifaceted jump from word to
action. The steps between hate speech and incitement to genocide have been shown in the
previous case studies with case law in chapters two and three. This jump involves
individuals utilizing dissemination of information with the intent to cause harm to a
group of peoples with intrinsically protected characteristics as defined in Article 20 of the
ICCPR. Intent rests on both the intended meaning by a speaker and the understood
meaning by the audience. In the previous chapter on Rwanda, the evolution of speech
was separated into categories before and during the genocide which illustrates the
evolution of a speaker inciting widespread violence. This chapter will build on those
examples with an explanation of the types of messages in a language that depends on
illocution for understanding. By defining these messages, the levels between hate speech
and genocide are easier to comprehend.
4.1 Individual Culpability on Genocide
Joseph Goebbels, the mastermind of the Final Solution, gave a speech on August
18, 1933, on the implications of a source of massive influence with the Volksempfänger,
a device cheap enough to distribute among all of Germany.174 Nazi Germany would go
onto utilizing the radio as key to Goebbels’ propaganda policy. Goebbels argued:
“It would not have been possible for us to take power or to use it in the ways we have
without the radio and the airplane. It is no exaggeration to say that the German
revolution, at least in the form it took, would have been impossible without the
airplane and the radio.”175
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The use of the radio by Nazi Germany signaled a turn towards a simpler method of
convincing the masses to act. Goebbels and his contemporaries were concerned with the
way this new revolution of media and technology could help National Socialism.176
Similarly, the individuals charged with direct and public incitement to genocide before
the ICTR were only concerned with spreading propaganda through mass media. In both
cases, the individuals were held responsible for the crime of genocide and not just the
regime.
The true power of mass media sources to invoke a violent response from everyday
Germans was shown with the indictment of Julius Streicher for his involvement with the
publication Der Stürmer as Goebbels committed suicide in the last days of the war.177
Although Streicher had not worked within the inner circle of National Socialism, he was
an example of an individual motivated by those in Hitler’s inner circle. His reputation as
“Jew-Baiter Number One” set him apart with his speeches and articles given weekly that
placed anti-Semitism into the minds of German peoples.178 In the judgment rendered by
the IMT, Streicher was found to, “…incited the German people to active persecution.
Each issue of Der Stürmer, which reached a circulation of 600,00 in 1935, was filled with
such articles, often lewd and disgusting.”179 Later the ICTR would recognize the
responsibility of individuals in the incitement of genocide.
4.2 Types of Messaging
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Populists embracing hate speech users of today feed on verbal contamination by
establishing a poisonous base through verbal radicalism. This cultural phenomenon is not
new and builds on remnants of a racially derogatory vocabulary from past decades, which
continued to exist in the language merely hidden behind a cloak of polite indifference.
According to Paul Sailer-Wlasits, the polluted and damaged core of ethnocentric and
völkisch language of the first half of the 20th Century has been repurposed by today’s
morally depraved populists as a rhetorical weapon. Such political leaders use the
abbreviated language to relate to large, apolitical sections of the population, who consider
themselves disenfranchised. Political leaders use words that are prejudiced to manipulate
a society hidden beneath cultural norms. The jump from spoken words to complexity
reduction and then to prejudice is multi-faceted.180 The same multi-step process that takes
hate speech to incitement can be viewed in a gradient of language, as in the model
proposed below.
The simple prosecution of incitement to genocide is insufficient to prevent future
crimes against humanity. One of the steps from word to action is the use of recoded
words such as the ones described in Chapter Two and employed before and during the
Rwandan Genocide. The main issue of recoded words is that every society has its own
social norms more or less regarding language.181 In order to interpret a message
positively or negatively, one must understand the intention of the speaker. In many cases
the illocution induces the action.182
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Table 2: Language Gradient
Non-Aggressive (Positively Connotated)

Aggressive (Negatively Connotated)

Polite and Politeness
Unpolite
Excessively Polite and Excessive
Politeness
Impolite
Aggressive and Aggression

Source: Szczęk, Joanna. “(Un)Höflichkeit: Indirekte Formen Sprachlicher Aggression.”
Sprachliche Gewalt, 2018, pp. 35 and 38.
This section distinguishes between forced politeness and intentional aggression
through language using the research of Joanna Szczęk work, which itself builds upon a
vast range of preexisting research. The gradient of language moves along a vertical axis,
where at the top non-aggressive language meets politeness and at the bottom aggressive
language corresponds to physical aggression. In between the two extremes, there exist
various types of language that depend on the reception in order to be interpreted as
positively or negatively connotated.183 Szczęk divides the utterances into five categories:
polite, unpolite, excessively polite, impolite, and aggressive.184 I would go even further
and claim that at the furthest end of the aggressive spectrum lies hate speech.
Polite pronouncements that can be interpreted as bearing a negative connotation
include are generally considered unpolite. Examples of this type include compliments
that are manipulative, exaggerated, trite, inadequate, coerced, ego boosting, and selfdeprecating.185 While in themselves they do not discriminate against people, they explain
how easily it is to construct words and phrases understood only by a single society.
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Impolite acts are those whose negative connotation corresponds to the speaker’s
intention. These speech acts can be divided into four types: the arrogate, the aversive, the
limitative, and the unreciprocal.186 All of these types represent a speaker actively forcing
impolite conversation.
The arrogate act corresponds to speakers whose illocutionary goal is to prove their
own superiority. In doing this, they position themselves as the authoritative voice in a
given context by relying, for example, om vulgar deprecating expressions when
addressing their own superiority.187 In the context of this analysis, both Rwanda’s and
Myanmar’s media relied on such acts when addressing their interlocutors.
The aversive type describes the speakers, who openly offend and attack their
interlocutors by charging against and destroying their world view and value system.188
This type of speech includes vulgar offenses meant to discriminate against a given group.
In Rwanda this strategy was used against the Tutsis, when the RTLM utilized allegations
and innuendos to discriminate and incite retaliation against them.
The other two types, the limitative and unreciprocal, do not directly align with
violent actions. The limitative type appears when speakers exert power by controlling
their interlocutors and by limiting their freedom of action in a conversation. Sarcasm,
false politeness, and manipulation all belong to this category.189 The unreciprocal type is
when speakers refuse to engage in a dialog and thereby breach the principle of mutuality
and acknowledgement of others in a conversation. This type is most often found when a
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speaker dominates a discussion but could apply to more extreme language found at the
bottom of the vertical axis.190
The aggressive nature of the bottom of the axis begin with unpolite speech acts. In
these acts, the speaker is aware of the negative undertone of the words. The speaker shifts
towards a more cognizant position when saying making utterances aimed at manipulating
an outcome.191 The impolite speech acts combine with aggressive illocution and serve as
the basis for hate speech that directly incites violence. Both the intent of aggressive
illocution and outcome can lead to dangerous speech. It is important to note that
dangerous speech does not always end with genocide.
Impolite phrases mixed with aggressive illocution only understood by certain
sectors of society lead to certain disparities between the controlling forces behind mass
media sources and the audience. When the individuals behind mass media sources such
as National Socialist Germany, Rwanda, and Myanmar are aware of the impact of their
words and their role in the overall premeditated plan, outcomes such as genocide are
common. In these cases, the question, is not if the genocide occurs but rather when the
genocide occurs and on what scale.
Aggression, as shown in the above table, depends on the intent behind the
interlocutor and the indirect or direct harm caused to an individual as a result of the
speech.192 For the purposes of this thesis, there are four characteristics of the aggressive
speech act. They are the action, intent, context, and outcome of the aggressive speech
act.193 These characteristics are applied in the decisions rendered by the ICTR on direct
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and public incitement to genocide. The intent of a speaker within a certain context can
induce a premeditated outcome. For this reason, the proper procedures and language are
needed to regulate media incitement to genocide. In the section below, the case for
amending the ICC’s Rome Statute is made on the treatment of incitement to genocide as
a separate crime in and of itself.
4.3 Amending the ICC’s Rome Statute
By using the operational definitions set forth in previous chapters and the integral
cases of Streicher before the IMT and Nahimana et al. before the ICTR, the legal
constraints of incitement to genocide are elucidated. The allowance of overt statements of
intent as punishable before the ICTR establishes a standard that could be used before
future military tribunals and international courts with some exceptions. The main
exception for applying the jurisprudence established on the crime on incitement in this
thesis before the ICC is that this court does not treat incitement as a separate crime.194
This is because the language of the Rome Statute does not mirror the Genocide
Convention which served as the basis for rulings issued by the ICTY and ICTR as shown
in the first chapter.
The factors prohibiting the application of this rule are explained in the research of
Thomas Davies. The three benefits of treating incitement to genocide as a separate crime
that inhibit the ICC’s potential as a legal enforcement power are clear. Firstly, when
treating incitement to genocide as a separate crime it provides a rather straightforward
path for proving the defendant committed incitement based on the characteristics
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provided in case law.195 Secondly, the language used in the past by the ICTY and ICTR
Statutes make it possible to hold a defendant accountable for aiding and abetting
incitement to genocide.196 The success of regulating media sources relies on charging
defendants with aiding and abetting incitement to genocide in the absence of physical
evidence confirming the defendant had committed crimes against humanity. Lastly,
treatment as a separate crime allows prosecutors to charge individuals for incitement even
when a crime on the scale of genocide has not yet been committed.197 As the ICC does
not treat this as a separate offense, it remains difficult to prosecute or regulate incitement
prior to the occurrence of a large-scale crime against humanity.
While changing the language of the Rome Statute to match the ICTY and ICTR
Statutes would offer the ability to broadly apply a standard legal definition, the ability of
an international body to amend its language in a manner fast enough to prevent genocide
in Myanmar is impossible.198 If the ICC were to amend the Rome Stature’s language to
mirror the Genocide Convention, then the ICC would have the beginning step towards
utilizing their legal enforcement power. In the absence of any change on this issue, the
ICC will not have the ability to issue any substantial ruling on the crime of incitement to
genocide.

Thomas E. Davies, “How the Rome Statute Weakens the International Prohibition on Incitement to
Genocide,” pp. 245.
196
Thomas E. Davies, “How the Rome Statute Weakens the International Prohibition on Incitement to
Genocide,” pp. 246.
197
Thomas E. Davies, “How the Rome Statute Weakens the International Prohibition on Incitement to
Genocide,” pp. 246.
198
Thomas E. Davies, “How the Rome Statute Weakens the International Prohibition on Incitement to
Genocide,” pp. 247.
195

53

Conclusion
As with Goebbels’ speech in 1933, the power to harness means of mass
information such as with the radio was not fully understood by the citizens of National
Socialist Germany. Goebbels recognized that the enforcement power of the Third Reich
came from the strength its air force, but he knew the widespread reach of the radio
provided the means necessary to conquer and complete his premeditated plan.199 The
masterminds of events on the scale of genocide are aware of the actions necessary to
accomplish their end goal especially in regards to mass media sources. This thesis has
argued that the legal standards presented from the IMT at Nuremberg up until the ICJ
today offer suitable jurisprudence on prosecuting media incited genocide after the
genocide has occurred but not for regulation of the acts before the genocide.
The case studies used in thesis with Rwanda and Myanmar provide examples how
long-term hierarchal structures can devolve into crimes against humanity and refugee
crises. The governments of National Socialist Germany and Rwanda in the 20th Century,
demonstrate that leaders understand the implications of a concerted plan and the benefits
of manipulating mass media sources such as the radio and newspaper. In today’s social
media culture, the impact of mass media is instantaneous. With events occurring
thousands of miles away in nations such as Myanmar, the world has begun to realize
what the spread of social media as a weapon means for future authoritarian
governments.200
The case studies and case law selected for this thesis have demonstrated
operational definitions for hate speech, intent, and direct and public incitement to
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genocide. This inclusion of cases from Nuremberg up until the ICTR demonstrate the
capacity in which the Genocide Convention can be employed. Although the Genocide
Convention was not developed until after the IMT, the decisions rendered on the crime of
incitement to genocide serves as jurisprudence for later cases. By explaining the cases in
the historical context, this thesis shows how speech, media, and genocide operate
together towards an end goal.
The usage of overt statements shown in publications before a crime has been
committed helps to clarify the context and intent of a speech act. The allowance for overt
statements of intent as punishable before the ICTR established a standard that could be
used before future military tribunals, but not by international courts such as the ICC. The
ICC and its language prohibit any meaningful regulation or prevention on behalf of the
court itself. If the ICC were to amend its language as proposed in Chapter Four, further
action would be easier to implement.
With all issues as large and complicated as genocide, there is never going to be a
one size fits all solution. Modern solutions will have to come from international courts
governments, and social media corporations themselves. Social media networks such as
Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram will need to be held accountable for the ways
individuals use their platform. In order to reduce the number of military accounts used on
social media platforms, individual corporations will have to police their own sites.
Whether the incentive comes from the government or the industry itself is
unknown. What is known about this new phenomena is that both individuals and
governments are using new sources of mass media to influence large sections of the
population. The sections of the population that are vulnerable to manipulation can be
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discerned through the types of language and method for engagement within the online
community. In future legislation, policy makers will need to focus on the intersection of
speech regulation and private industry. In the United States of America, legislators will
have to be mindful of the First Amendment and restrictions it places on regulation of
speech. As of now, the international community is bound by the current customs and
norms established in this thesis. There is no mechanism in play that can regulate speech
in a capacity that will prevent genocide. The international community can prosecute
incitement to genocide through post-war tribunals, but current legal institutions require
reform before any international regulations are implemented.
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